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
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

The Developing Soviet Submarine Force

Special Report WEEKLY REVIEW

Top Secret

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13 September 1968 SC No.00787/68B

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SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelligence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Special Reports are published separately to permit more comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically indicated.

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THE DEVELOPING SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE

The Soviet naval leadership, commanding the world's largest submarine fleet, is undertaking a program to increase the operational capabilities of the force. Four new classes of submarines—three torpedo-attack classes and a new Polaris-type missile-firing submarine—are in production, and several older classes are being improved and reconditioned. In addition, since the early 1960s the range, number, and duration of open ocean patrols by Soviet submarines have been generally increasing.

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Fleet Modernization

The new Polaris-type submarine--designated the Y-class-carries 16 SS-N-6 ballistic missiles with ranges of some 1,500
miles. These 425-foot-long submarines are currently being built
at Severodvinsk in the Soviet
Northern Fleet area. The first
units should be operational soon
and 40 or more could be in service by the mid-1970s.

Two new classes of nuclearpowered attack submarines are
also being built--one at Leningrad shipyard and the other at
Gorkiy. At least one of these
classes probably was specifically
designed to engage enemy submarines. A third class of attack
submarine is under construction
in the Soviet Far East; its means
of propulsion is not yet known.

In addition to these new construction programs, the Soviets are reconditioning many of their older classes of submarines. There are no indications that the Soviets intend to introduce a new class of cruise-missile submarine, however, and construction of these submarines is apparently ending as the Soviets approach their desired force level for these anticarrier units.

Operational Implications


Strategic targets in the middle of the US are beyond reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5

carried on the older ballisticmissile submarines, but are
within range of the SS-N-6
carried on the Y-class. By
the mid-1970s, Soviet ballistic-missile submarines may
present a strategic threat comparable to that of the US Polaris
fleet and be able to operate with
less risk of detection than
earlier classes of Soviet missile submarines.

The introduction of the new classes of attack submarines suggests that the Soviets are attempting to come to grips with the Polaris threat. The Soviets apparently are counting on their submarines to help blunt that threat by attempting to destroy Polaris submarines before they can launch their missiles.

Soviet ballistic-missile submarines frequently patrol within range of US Polaris bases and could destroy a number of Polaris submarines by attacking these bases. new Soviet attack submarines may be able to locate and destroy a few Polaris submarines in confined waters through which those submarines frequently must pass, such as the Irish Sea or the Sicilian Straits. Combined operations with new Soviet surface ships, such as the Moskva-class helicopter carriers and Kresta- and Kashinclass guided-missile ships, will provide some antisubmarine capability in the ocean approaches

The Soviet Submarine Force



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Nuclear-powered Ballistic missile Cruise missile Attack	9 16 14	0 0 0	0 0 0	1 17 4	
Diesel-powered Ballistic missile Cruise missile Attack	18 11 91	1 3 64	1 5 32	8 6 65	

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES




Y-CLASS

Nuclear powered Carries 16 SS-N-6 missiles in hull 425 feet long Now being deployed



H-CLASS

Nuclear powered Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail 380 feet long 9 in service



G-CLASS

Diesel powered Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail 320 feet long 22 in service



Z-CONVERSION CLASS

Diesel powered Carries two SS-N-4 missiles in sail 295 feet long 6 in service

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CLASSES OF SOVIET SUBMARINES

Nuclear Powered		Diesel Powered			
Ballistic Missile	Y . H	Ballistic Missile	G Z Conversion		
Cruise Missile	E-1 E-11	Cruise Missile	J W Conversion		
Attack	N	Attack	F		
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to the USSR and in the Mediter-ranean.

Deployment Patterns

Soviet submarines are assigned to each of the four fleets--Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea. Because of the restricted exits from the Baltic and Black Seas, however, most of the missile-equipped units and all of the nuclear-powered units are based in ice-free ports of the Kola Peninsula (Northern Fleet) and in the Pacific Fleet.

The Soviets are apparently trying to reduce the disproportion between the two major fleets—the Northern and the Pacific. Although the Northern Fleet still holds the favored position, several nuclear submarines have been transferred under the polar ice to the Pacific and a number of modern diesel units have joined the

Northern Sea Route convoy in past summers.

The Baltic Fleet is responsible for protecting Soviet coastal waters and for furnishing diesel submarines for patrols off the US Polaris base at Holy Loch. Moscow has also begun sending Baltic Fleet submarines to the Mediterranean to take some of the strain off the Northern Fleet, which has been furnishing most of the units operating there. There are no nuclear submarines in the Baltic, and the few cruise-missile units there operate in coastal waters.

The Montreux Convention of 1936 places severe limitations on the passage of Soviet submarines through the Turkish Straits. Black Sea - based submarines can pass into the Mediterranean only if they are headed for another fleet area for repairs. For this reason, only older diesel units are based in the Black Sea. Once in the Mediterranean, however, these units operate there for about 60 days on their way to and from Baltic shipyards.

Patrol Activity

Most of the increase in the level of Soviet submarine operations during the past year is attributable to the stationing of a force of six to ten submarines--mostly diesel attack units--in the Mediterranean since

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
June 1967; at least one nuclear unit is usually included in the force. There was an overall increase of nearly 20 percent in the number of Soviet submarine patrols beyond local fleet operating areas in 1967, but if the trend noted so far this year continues, fewer submarines will deploy in 1968. Patrols this year have been of longer duration, however, thereby resulting in more submarine time at sea.

No confirmed patrols by H-class ballistic-missile units have been noted since late 1966, and there have beenperiods during the past year when no Soviet ballistic-missile submarines have been on patrol in either the Atlantic or Pacific. The G-class is the only such submarine now being used for midocean patrols.

Conversion and overhaul of first-generation ballistic-

Soviet
Submarine Deployments
1965-1968

Total 138



Number of deployed units, not including routine interfleet transfers or fleet exercise participants.

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missile submarines and the reassignment of their crews to new Y-class units have probably been at least partly responsible for the decline in ballisticmissile submarine activity. addition, the loss of a G-class submarine in the Pacific in mid-March apparently resulted in a three-month standdown in patrols by these units. That incident probably caused the Soviets to implement new safety measures. Moreover, as the Soviets prepare to deploy new Y-class submarines, they may be reassessing the military value of sending their diesel-powered units into the mid-Atlantic and mid-Pacific patrol areas.


Until mid-1967, E-class cruise-missile submarines conducted regular patrols in the Atlantic. Since June 1967, patrol activity in the Atlantic has diminished; however, a series of single E-class units has been almost continuously present in the Mediterranean. Some of the submarines on recent patrols have also engaged in other activities such as hydroacoustic research and support of naval training maneuvers. J-class diesel-powered cruise-missile submarines apparently have been used primarily for peripheral defense. In late 1966, the first of these units to venture into the Mediterranean broke down and limped back to its base in the Northern Fleet. Some of the

older W-class units are equipped to launch cruise missiles, but these, too, operate only near Soviet shores and probably are being retired from service.

Recent patrols by diesel attack submarines in the Mediterranean have been extended to as long as six months through the use of Arab and Yugoslav ports for upkeep, reprovisioning, and crew recreation. Previous patrols by Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean had lasted less than two months.

Last year, a submarine support group operated for nearly six months off the west coast of Africa in a program to study the feasibility of submarine operations from a floating base. The group consisted of a submarine tender and a missile supply ship, and was assisted briefly by a survey vessel and two intelligence collection ships. Several other ships provided logistic support. Four submarines participated in the group's operations. One of these--a nuclear-powered unit-was away from home waters for more than six months.

Once the new ballistic-missile submarines go on patrol, the Soviets may make greater use of such floating support bases on the high seas. Floating base ships would be vulnerable in



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wartime, but ballistic-missile submarines operating from such bases south of the Azores, for example, could remain on-station off the US coast longer than could units deployed from the Kola area. Cruise-missile and attack submarines would also profit from mid-ocean bases, reducing the number of long transits to and from patrol areas.

The USSR recently has achieved several technological advances in submarine support. New and more powerful radio transmitters serving submarines on distant patrols are now in

operation in the USSR. gation satellite system currently being tested may permit Soviet submarines to determine their positions with greater accuracy even in the most unfavorable weather and sea conditions. Hydroacoustic research ships have conducted surveys in the past few years in areas of the Atlantic and Pacific where the Soviets might hope to detect Polaris submarines and in the Canary Island Basin and Philippine Sea where they may intend to operate their own submarines. (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK AND CANADA)

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